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sketches of Francis Joseph and William II. (the latter in the seventh chapter, although it should come first), and a chapter on "Germany Prepares for War" consisting chiefly of quotations from the French Yellow and Belgian Grey Books. That is all about the "authors of the war". M. Daudet has something to say about the diplomatic circle of Vienna in July, 1914, describes the last journey of Francis Ferdinand, fulminates against the dishonesty of the Ballplatz in the month following the assassination: a rehash of the daily press and the diplomatic correspondence. He concludes with a brief analysis, based largely on the French Yellow Book, of the ultimatum to Serbia and the ensuing negotiations.

M. Daudet writes with characteristic French charm, his narrative bristles with interesting conversations and intimate touches, and his patriotism makes him a good hater. But he adds little to our knowledge and ventures no new interpretations. It is to be hoped that the third volume, *Les Complices*, will be more stimulating.

BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT.

Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le Congrès de Berlin jusqu'à nos Jours. Par A. DEBIDOUR, Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Paris. Seconde Partie. *Vers la Grande Guerre (1904-1916)*. (Paris: Félix Alcan. 1917. Pp. 379.)

THE second volume of M. Debidour's survey of European diplomacy during the past generation bears out the promise of its predecessor. It is concise, comprehensive, and well proportioned. Taking up the narrative with the Russo-Japanese War, the author carries it on in nine chapters to the summer of 1916. The two opening chapters are devoted to the struggle in Manchuria with its diplomatic effects, and to the first Moroccan crisis. The Hague Convention of 1907 forms the subject of the third. Then follows a description of the diplomatic conflict between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente in 1908 and 1911, characterized by the Casablanca and Bosnian crises in the former year and the Agadir crisis in the latter. Near-Eastern affairs are studied in the two succeeding chapters, which include the Tripolitan War, the formation of the Balkan League, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, and the European situation immediately previous to the great explosion. Chapter VIII. analyzes the crisis of 1914, and the final chapter sketches the events which led to the entrance of Turkey, Italy, and Bulgaria, into the struggle. His narrative finished, the author permits himself, in a brief three pages, to characterize frankly German policy, which by its disregard of the law of nations has made inevitable the infinite calamity of the general war. The volume is concluded with *pièces justificatives* which extend over fifty pages and include such documents as the General Act of the Algeciras Conference, the Final Act of the Hague Convention, Franco-British conventions, and correspondence between Kiderlen-Waechter and Jules Cambon.

Those who look for a general explanation of the causes of the war will be disappointed, for the author has rigidly confined himself, at least until his narrative reaches the year 1914, to his purpose of exposing coldly and succinctly the diplomatic relations of the European countries. Discussion of all the psychological and economic factors which helped to prepare the titanic conflict is carefully excluded, except as those factors bear directly upon official diplomacy. The reader is assumed to have an understanding of the origins and development of German world-policy. German plans in Mesopotamia are barely noticed, not coming under the head of official diplomacy; the Bagdad Railway is mentioned only four times in the entire work. To Anglo-German relations the author devotes less than four pages, while the attempts at naval compromise receive only half a page. In thus avoiding the temptation to make his book a general disquisition upon the causes of the war, M. Debidour has found place for the details of official diplomacy which have thus far been published only in monographs. The immediate interest of the work for the ordinary reader is undoubtedly lessened, but its permanent value to the student of diplomatic history for purposes of reference is enormously enhanced.

It is not unnatural that the author should allow his personal convictions to appear rather more plainly in the present volume than in its predecessor. His interpretation conforms in the main to that generally accepted by French, English, and American writers. In his excellent exposition of the Moroccan crises he shows that Germany had no serious cause for complaint against France and England in 1905 and 1911, and that German aggressiveness resulted chiefly from the determination to punish France for daring to take independent action as well as from the conviction that Russia was unable to proffer assistance. The Bosnian crisis of 1908 was, in M. Debidour's opinion, the direct result of Russian anaemia, which gave to Austria the chance to solidify her position in the Balkans, and to Germany another opportunity for demonstrating the strength of the Triple Alliance against that of the newly formed Triple Entente. In dealing with the final crisis of 1914, the author frankly states his purpose of demolishing the German thesis that the war was forced upon the Central Powers. In this, as it seems to the reviewer, M. Debidour is entirely successful and offers perhaps the clearest brief analysis of the twelve days that has yet been published.

It could hardly be expected that this volume, treating of events of contemporary import, should be so satisfactory as to scholarly character as the first volume. Inevitably, the author becomes more French in his point of view. This accounts for his failure to treat adequately of Anglo-German relations, and also, doubtless, for his unwillingness to accord full credit to the English diplomats at Algeciras (Sir Arthur Nicholson is hardly mentioned) and during the Agadir crisis, for the firm and invaluable support they gave the French. The significance of the Anglo-Russian reconciliation is also slurred over. More serious is

the absence of direct references, a characteristic which in the first volume was a mistake, but which in its successor becomes a defect of great importance. Many of M. Debidour's statements of fact should be made as conjectures or at least supported by the citation of definite authorities; such, for example, are his assertion of German intrigues in Morocco, his account of the origins of the Balkan League, and his description of Austrian encouragement to Bulgaria in 1913. When evidence is adduced it is not always adequate: a single paragraph from Bernhardt suffices as text for broad generalizations upon the German mentality, and the sole authority quoted as proof of Germany's aggressive intentions after 1911 is the French Yellow Book of 1914.

Should an American edition of M. Debidour's important work be undertaken, we may hope that the editor will adduce exact and adequate references for all unqualified statements of important facts. The bibliographies, which contain merely French authorities and are entirely uncritical, might also be amplified to advantage, while the brief index could certainly be extended and improved. With such corrections, students of recent European history would find in M. Debidour's work a manual of diplomacy which should prove constantly of the greatest value.

CHARLES SEYMOUR.

The Great War. By GEORGE H. ALLEN, Ph.D., HENRY C. WHITEHEAD, Captain in the United States Army, and Admiral F. E. CHADWICK, U. S. N. Volume II. *The Mobilization of the Moral and Physical Forces.* (Philadelphia: George Barrie's Sons. 1916. Pp. xxii, 494.)

At the present time issuing a history of the Great War might seem to commend itself more to publishers than to writers, for there must be enormous difficulty in composing such a work on the large scale here attempted in the limited time at one's disposal. The author truly says that no inconsiderable body of primary documents is now available, and it is likewise true that he makes effective use of the newspapers which will be consulted hereafter by those who write of these matters; but already the mass of material is overwhelming unless one has abundant time to go through it in leisurely fashion, which the plan of the present work precludes, while so close as yet are the events to be narrated and so difficult are problems of perspective and judgment, that only by accident or stroke of prophecy or genius could much that is brilliant or profound be combined with what is scholarly and careful. Such a book ought indeed to be written; I have myself read it with interest and without regret; and there is certainly an inexhaustible demand for information on this subject, which had better be satisfied by the work of cautious scholars than by journalists and partizan writers. But it is unnecessary to say that writing of this kind cannot have qualities of permanence or